Major General James Ewell Brown Stuartís performance in General Robert E. Leeís Maryland Campaign during September 1862 has been described by some historians as lacking in the qualities that Lee would need for his ambitious foray into Maryland1 while others find that his actions were at least adequate if not meritorious2. This paper will examine Stuartís actions during that campaign concentrating on those before the Battle of Sharpsburg and provide a critical evaluation of his and his cavalryís performance and how it affected the outcome of Leeís Maryland Campaign. Stuartís actions during this campaign were part of and controlled by Leeís late 1862 strategy and must be evaluated in light of his tactical moves implementing that strategy. This paper will first review Leeís strategy and how it affected Stuartís actions. As part of this review, Leeís command style will be discussed vis-‡-vis Stuartís well-known desire for entertainment and self aggrandizement along with Leeís specific preparations for this campaign affecting the cavalry. Next, intelligence gathering techniques and their use for both sides will be briefly presented along with a review of Leeís famous "Lost Order." Leeís few written communications to Stuart will be checked to see if Stuart was able to comply with his commanderís desires. Stuartís most controversial actions, his Urbana, Maryland, dance and his failures at South Mountain will be looked at in some detail. Finally, a summary of Stuartís actions will lead into a final analysis of his total performance as Leeís "eyes and ears" during the Maryland Campaign.
Leeís strategic plan was based on his belief that the time was ripe for a move into the border state of Maryland not only to continue the momentum he generated in defeating Major General George McClellan during the Seven Daysí Campaign and Major General John Pope at Second Manassas, but to draw the Union hosts north of the Potomac and away from war-ravaged Virginia. He was certain that the Union army was demoralized after those battles and that the time was propitious to carry the war north before their army could reorganize and reinforce.3 Concomitantly, he thought it reasonable that, also based on his earlier experiences, any pursuit by Union forces from the defenses around Washington would be slow, cautious, and disorganized. Additionally, after months of hard campaigning, his troops desperately needed time to rest and recuperate so the lush, untouched farms and fields of Western Maryland and possibly Pennsylvania could provide the victuals and forage his army required.4 Lee also expressed several other reasons for this campaign including luring potential recruits into his army, but more importantly, to force the U.S. government into a position of appearing to wish to continue the war against states only seeking their independence. Influencing the 1862 U.S. Congressional elections was also part of his thinking as was the influence a winning campaign would have on foreign governmentsí opinions of aid to the South.5 Given Leeís views of his previous successes, and the potential for further progress towards freeing the South, Lee had very few realistic strategic moves left that would give the many attainable advantages this move into Maryland could provide.
To attain these possible advantages, Lee relied on his ragtag veterans. He had only been in command of what he named the Army of Northern Virginia for about three months after General Joseph E. Johnstonís severe wounding at Seven Pines and was still learning the capabilities of his men and their leaders. His leadership style for this army was still one of keeping loose reins despite a few noteworthy failures during the Seven Daysí Campaign when some of his complex but well-planned attacks failed due to his subordinate generalsí poor coordination and execution. Stuartís actions during the Seven Daysí Campaign was good, especially noteworthy was his very successful "First Ride Around McClellan" during which he obtained valuable intelligence for Lee. Leeís optimistic belief in his commanding generals during the Maryland Campaign led him to divide his army into four, then five parts, without detailed written orders to any of those commanders, although it is fairly certain that, as in any campaign, he spoke with them, personally conveying his wishes and discussing alternatives.6 Leeís relatively complacent frame of mind derived from his experience during the prior few months and led to his well-founded but incorrect analysis that the beaten and demoralized Union forces would need time to reform. There was no reason for Lee to believe that the slow-moving Federal army was going to be such a threat that unusual expediency or detailed instructions on his part were needed.
Stuart, as the cavalry division commander reporting directly to Lee, could not help but be influenced by this relaxed control of his army commander, but the danger with Stuart was that the "Gay Cavalier" needed tighter control and guidance than any of Leeís other top commanders. Stuart was known to be an excellent cavalry leader as well as personally brave, but he was also prone to showy, flamboyant, and sometimes impulsive behavior, seeking and enjoying public acclaim and female adoration.7 As Lee matured as an army commander, especially after the Battle of Gettysburg, he would be more careful in making his wishes known, especially to Stuart, giving less discretion to his corps commanders. As will be seen during the Maryland Campaign, Stuartís penchant for frivolity came into play arguably detrimentally affecting his performance.
Lee had done little formal reorganization of his relatively new command since Second Manassas and the Battle of Chantilly; his 6,4008 man cavalry division was still commanded by Jeb Stuart. It consisted of three brigades: Brigadier General Wade Hamptonís Brigade containing the 1st North Carolina Cavalry, 2nd South Carolina Cavalry, 10th Virginia Cavalry, Cobbís (Georgia) Legion, and the Jeff. Davis (Mississippi) Legion; Fitzhugh Leeís Brigade of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 9th Virginia Cavalry; and Colonel Thomas Munford commanding Robertsonís Brigade of the 2nd, 6th, 7th, and 12th Virginia Cavalry and the 17th Virginia Battalion.9 Munford had relieved Brigadier General Beverly Robertson on 4 September,10 Robertson having been transferred to North Carolina. Robertson, not a friend of Stuart or Lee, had performed poorly under Major General "Stonewall" Jackson at the Battle of Cedar Mountain on 9 August 1862 and with mixed results under Stuart; Robertson, a good administrator, trainer and disciplinarian, performed poorly in combat as his subsequent service amply demonstrated.11 Ironically, Munford, Stuartís newest commander, did much heavy fighting in Maryland doing an excellent job. Stuart also commanded the Horse Artillery under Captain John Pelham with R.P. Chewís (Virginia) battery; J.F. Hartís (South Carolina) battery, and Pelhamís (Virginia) battery.
In his preparations for his Maryland adventure, Lee took measures to ready his army including Stuartís cavalry division. In Special Orders No. 187 issued on 2 September he directed Stuart to send men from his command who had unserviceable horses due to overwork or lack of shoes to return to Second Manassas. There, in addition to resting and reshoeing, the men were to collect arms and other materials to be shipped to Richmond for repair and redistribution.12 Clearly he wanted Stuartís cavalry in good condition for its upcoming exertions but one could question that Lee might have relied more on Stuartís abilities as a commander to organize his own troopers. However, as seen in some of his other communications, Lee was probably more concerned with collecting arms than with reshoeing horses. At this stage of the war, the South still was relying on the Union as a key supplier of armaments.
During this campaign, Stuart was true to form with his penchant for frolic and female attention. He was "fond of show and with much personal vanity, craving admiration in the parlor as well as on the field, with a taste for music and poetry and song, desiring as much the admiration of handsome women... with full appreciation of his won well-won eminence"13 is how one of Jacksonís staff described him. One of his most memorable and notorious escapades occurred on the evening of 8 September near his headquarters at Urbana, Maryland. Stuart and his Prussian aide, Major Heros von Borcke, planned the ball to be held at an abandoned female academy to thank a local family, the Cockys, for their hospitality, and to entertain an attractive, favorite female kinswomen of theirs known as the "the New York Rebel."14 Stuart supplied music using Brigadier General William Barksdaleís 18th Mississippi band and decorated the hall with their Mississippi regimentsí battle flags. Enlisted men and junior officers were employed in cleaning the hall and inviting guests while von Borcke supplied the hand-written invitations and supervised the decorations adding bouquets of roses.15 While the ball progressed splendidly, a few miles away towards Hyattstown, the 1st New York Cavalry decided on a reconnaissance resulting in pushing back some of Hamptonís videttes. News of this skirmish was brought to Stuart at the ball; Stuart and his staff mounted and rode to the scene accompanied by Pelhamís horse artillery and soon drove off the outgunned New Yorkers. Stuart and his victorious troopers then returned to the ball and recommenced the festivities only to be interrupted by Confederate casualties being taken upstairs above the ballroom. Stuart and his officers lost many of their comely ladies-turned-surgeons as they treated the enlisted wounded. The ball then continued to dawn.16 Stuart and his staff spent the next day in needful relaxation, Stuart next visiting army "headquarters, where he flirted with Miss Katherine Markall and her friends."17 "Stuart was ready to see and talk to every good-looking woman"18 during his visits to Leeís army headquarters in Bestís Grove near Frederick.
Stuartís actions in camp in Maryland were similar to those encountered in his various Virginia headquarters but one must question his judgment in continuing to pursue such merriment in unfriendly country in the face of the Army of the Potomac advancing towards him. One of his headquarters staff officers called the sojourn at Urbana "delightful" since "[t]here was nothing to do but await the advance of the great army preparing around Washington" and enjoy "the society of the charming girls around us to the utmost."19 The staff officer does go on to state that the horses remained saddled day and night and that the staff slept with their clothes and spurs on, so Stuart at least looked to be ready to dash off at any moment to attend his duties. Clearly, Stuartís mood of jollity and lack of serious concern about the enemy prevailed and infected his staff. It is likely, however, that this mood was at least partially influenced by Leeís relative calm state of mind believing that the Union advance was typical of what he saw of the events during the Peninsular Campaign prior to the Seven Daysí Campaign. That slow, cautious advance he expected here too, even though he did not know that McClellan was back in charge and was moving faster than Lee would "find convenient" as he would later write. Complacency in the Confederate camps should not have infected Stuart since he, as Leeís eyes and ears, should have watched the enemy as closely as possible to ensure that Lee was not surprised. Stuartís frivolities can be criticized since he did not keep Lee well informed about Union movements and obviously portrayed relative unconcern spending much time and effort in entertaining himself and his staff, efforts better directed at assiduously scouting the enemy. His poor scouting was his most noteworthy fault in this campaign.
In addition to Leeís assumption that the Union army would respond to his moves slowly,20 he further assumed that large Union garrisons at Martinsburg and Harperís Ferry would, upon learning that the Confederate army was between them and Washington, abandon those locations and retreat.21 Since Lee planned to use the Shenandoah Valley as his line of communication, it was critical that these two garrisons not impede his line. Even though Lee initially expected to meet most of his food and forage needs in Maryland, ammunition was critical; Winchester was to be his major supply depot but Lee did not ensure that Martinsburg and Harperís Ferry were evacuated. He fell into the trap of assuming that those garrisons would follow reasonable military tactics but he did not know that Harperís Ferry, to which the Martinsburg garrison retreated, was ordered to remain in place and to fight until relieved by the Army of the Potomac.22 Thus, these two failed assumptions resulted in Lee having to divide his army into four parts, three to capture Martinsburg and Harperís Ferry, and the fourth to march to Hagerstown. Stuartís upcoming poor performance at South Mountain began with this division which led to his failure to follow Leeís instructions to hold the mountain passes.
Lee relied on Stuart for intelligence of the enemyís moves but also used other available means including civilian reports and newspapers such as the Baltimore Sun.23 However, intelligence in a mostly hostile area was not as readily obtained or as reliable as in Virginia thus Lee was forced to use what was at hand. However, there is little documentary evidence of Leeís intelligence sources save for the capture by Stuartís troopers of the Union lookout station on Sugarloaf Mountain on 6 September which they held until Brigadier General Alfred Pleasontonís troopers recaptured it on 11 September.24 Nothing is reported of what use Confederates made of its commanding vista. Based on other campaigns, Lee probably had direct or indirect access to some of the other usual sources including prisoner interrogations, captured documents or intercepted telegraph messages, etc., but given the results of his actions during this campaign based on what he knew, Leeís intelligence gathering was inadequate. Apparently a Confederate "secret service fund of several hundred dollars in greenbacks... [available] through Col. Porter Alexander" did not prove helpful either.25 However, it is also true that McClellanís intelligence in this generally friendly country was little better than Leeís. Stuart and Pleasonton maintained fairly effective cavalry screens thwarting both Union and Confederate efforts to gauge the otherís movements.26 At least Lee was not hampered by greatly exaggerated reports of his opponentís troop strengths to the same extent as was McClellan who had Allan Pinkerton to thank. If there was one intelligence coup of this campaign, it was McClellanís finding the famous Lost Order, Leeís Special Order, No. l91 on 13 September. McClellan arguably had all the intelligence he needed to annihilate Lee, but he was unable to discern which was accurate and reliable, and he characteristically failed to move quickly enough even after finding the Lost Order.27
The various possible explanations of how this order was lost28 are not as important as the results of its finding which merits a brief discussion as it reflects on Stuartís and Leeís subsequent actions. Harsh believes that its finding had little consequence because McClellan was already moving more rapidly than Lee and Stuart knew and believed29 and that regardless, the Army of the Potomac realistically did not have the abilities needed to chase down Leeís fragmented army.30 Stuart informed Lee on the evening of 13 September that McClellan had been given a document which appeared to be one of some import. However, not until after the war did Lee declare that McClellanís finding of the order was "a great misfortune" and that up to that time, McClellan had been moving slowly.31 Stuartís inability to accurately gauge Union movements and numbers may not necessarily reflect poorly on Stuartís scouting but show the effectiveness of Union efforts to thwart such attempts. Also, operating in a hostile country in the face of larger Union forces had to negatively affect Stuartís reconnaissance. Stuartís tardy report dated 13 February 1864 about his Maryland Campaign typically underplays his inability to accurately understand Union deployments and movements. For example, on 12 September, he reported that [t]he enemy studiously avoided displaying any force, except a part of Burnsideís corps, and built no camp-fires in their halt at Frederick that night" so Stuart, despite taking "[e]very means...to ascertain what the nature of the enemyís movement was", was unsuccessful.32 The normally resourceful Stuart was here thwarted by lack of campfires and was unable to use any of his usual clever schemes to gather information about Union movements. Certainly McClellanís responses upon finding the lost order and Leeís actions after its finding define the remainder of the campaign, the only controversial aspect being how much difference it made in reality. Many historians agree with Leeís post-war statement that it was the deciding factor; however, some disagree arguing that McClellan was already moving relatively quickly before finding the order.
Stuartís inability to give Lee accurate information of Federal movements before the order was found resulted in Lee not worrying about dividing his army into four parts to take Harperís Ferry and Martinsburg. Once it was found, Stuartís inaccurate reports of the ensuing Union pursuit put Leeís divided army at serious risk of being defeated in detail because Stuart, and therefore Lee, believed that McClellan was marching the bulk of his forces directly to relieve Harperís Ferry. That this made good military sense for McClellan in Leeís eyes cannot be disputed. But Lee overestimated the numbers of Union forces sent directly to rescue the Harperís Ferry garrison, and he did not know, because of lack of good intelligence, that heavy forces were instead being sent to Turnerís Gap. McClellan believed that he could send his forces through the gaps in South Mountain then turn south to relieve Harperís Ferry. His plan was only thwarted by that garrisonís precipitate surrender. Another major factor contributing to Leeís near disaster at South Mountain was Stuartís and Leeís lack of knowledge that Jackson had not quickly taken the Martinsburg and Harperís Ferry garrisons according to plan. Once Lee learned of this delay, he quickly realized that he had to prevent McLaws from being overwhelmed from the rear so Lee now had to defend the South Mountain gaps. Added concern for Lee was that his army was then fragmented into five parts since he had sent Longstreet with the army trains to Hagerstown based on an inaccurate report of a Union advance from Pennsylvania. Here again, accurate reports would have allowed Longstreetís forces to remain closer to Boonsborough to have given quicker support to Hill at the South Mountain passes. One could easily argue that Stuart should have been charged with helping to ensure that Leeís scattered units would remain in better contact with the army commander but evidence shows that Leeís three forces contending at Harperís Ferry and even Stuart himself maintained inadequate and tardy contact with army headquarters, this despite having cavalry detachments assigned to the detached commands.33
Leeís instructions to Stuart during the campaign are brief but provide some insight regarding Leeís requirements. On 3 September, Lee had Stuart send Fitzhugh Leeís and Hamptonís brigades in feints towards Washington at Alexandria and Dranesville, Virginia, to distract and confuse the enemy; Stuart and his command then rested blissfully at Dranesville.34 On 5 September Lee ordered Stuart to screen for Jacksonís troops as they entered Maryland but Stuart failed to accomplish much on Jacksonís behalf leading a worried Jackson to use part of his infantry as a screen to the east.35 Also on 5 September, Stuart was reminded to "keep careful watch for a Federal movement from Washington and to report the slightest sign of an advance."36 Stuartís early mission of demonstrating towards Washington and Baltimore on both flanks of the Union advances to deceive and confuse them37 was later augmented by requirements to screen the army, scout and delay the Union advance.38 In Special Orders No. 191 dated 9 September, Stuartís role was described in paragraph VIII: "General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that may have been left behind." These assignments were poorly done since the troopers numbers were too small to be of much use for each command as screeners or scouts and apparently were not well used as couriers. Part of Stuartís mission was amended by Lee on 13 September after learning more of the Union advance: Stuart was to keep Major General Lafayette McLaws on Maryland Heights "informed of the movements of the enemy."39 Leeís dispatch the day before told McLaws that Stuartís cavalry occupied the Middletown Valley.40 Stuart now must help McLaws by protecting his flanks and rear while providing him intelligence. Stuart apparently took this additional mission to help McLaws to heart as he decided to leave the defense of Turnerís Pass, on the National Road which led to Boonsboro, exclusively to Major General Daniel H. Hill without telling either Hill or Lee. Stuart and his headquarters moved south after leaving Colonel Thomas Rosserís 5th Virginia Cavalry with Hill.41 Rosser, posted to Foxís Gap, a smaller gap a mile south of Turnerís Gap, did not receive adequate instructions from Stuart who appeared unconcerned, leading to Rosserís post-war comment that "Stuart did not expect the enemy would advance on Boonsboro, and was careless in guarding the roads leading that way."42
Likely Lee was suffering from not being more specific in his requirements to Stuart because he believed that a substantial part of Stuartís division was holding Turnerís Pass in South Mountain with Hillís support as part of Leeís desire that Stuart cover the armyís rear. Lee learned that "the enemy was advancing more rapidly than was convenient from Fredericktown, [so Lee]...determined to return with Longstreetís command to South Mountain, to strengthen Hillís and Stuartís divisions, engaged in holding the passes of the mountains, lest the enemy should fall upon McLawís rear, drive him from the Maryland Heights, and thus relieve the garrison at Harperís Ferry."43
Lee reiterated Stuartís role after the army left Frederick and moved west in his 19 August 1863 final official report of the Harperís Ferry and Maryland operations. "General Stuart, with the cavalry, remained east of the mountains, to observe the enemy and retard his advance."44 With the benefit of hindsight, Lee describes the events which led to the Battle of South Mountain stimulated by McClellanís finding of S.O. 191. "[McClellan] immediately began to push forward rapidly, and on the afternoon of the 13th was reported approaching the pass in South Mountain, on the Boonsborough and Fredericktown road. The cavalry under General Stuart fell back before him, materially impeding his progress by its gallant resistance, and gaining time for preparations to oppose his advance."45 In this later report Lee downplayed Stuartís lead role in the planned defense of Turnerís Pass but accurately described Stuartís role in delaying the Union advance from Frederick and through the Catoctin Mountains to the foot of South Mountain before Turnerís Gap.
One of the key complaints against Stuart has been that he seriously underestimated the forces that were pursuing him to South Mountain. Stuart asked Hill to send a brigade to South Mountain to help hold it because two Federal brigades were chasing him. Hill sent Colonel Alfred Colquitt first and after the Union troops stopped at the base of the mountain, Colquitt talked with Stuart suggesting that the infantry could hold the turnpike with Stuartís troopers guarding the roads around the gap. However, Stuart said that "he could not remain—that he should move with his cavalry toward Harpers Perryóthat I would have no difficulty holding my position—that the enemyís forces, he thought, consisted of cavalry and one or two brigades of infantry."46After Stuart told Hill this inaccurate news, and believing that Turnerís Gap was no place for cavalry, he moved south heading for McLaws position, leaving Hill to face overwhelming odds. Stuartís comments regarding use of his cavalry in and near the gap clearly show that his preferred method for fighting his cavalry was mounted,47 but shortly events showed dismounted Confederate cavalry at Foxís and Cramptonís Gaps were effective. Stuartís official report also states that he gave full information to Hill,48 an obvious effort to deny Hillís claims that Stuart told him little of value of the Union approach.49
Stuart had decided that the main Union effort would be directly from Frederick to Harperís Ferry so he departed for McLawsí command with Hamptonís forces leaving Colonel Munford at Cramptonís Gap located about seven miles south of Turnerís Gap. McLaws later stated that Stuart gave him poor intelligence about the Union strength near Cramptonís Gap: "[Stuart] told me he did not believe there was more than a brigade of the enemy".50 Thus within two days, Stuart had given wildly inaccurate estimates of Union numbers to Hill at Turnerís Gap, and McLaws about Cramptonís Gap. In both instances, Stuart rode away from these critical areas leaving inadequate forces for their defense. Subsequently, both gaps were quickly forced by overwhelming strength. "The usually reliable Stuart was either off his form or suffering a patch of bad luck".51 Stuart again defends his actions by noting that Fitzhugh Leeís Brigade successfully defended the rear of the Confederate retreat from Turnerís Gap and Hamptonís Brigade McLawís rear from Pleasant Valley to Harperís Ferry. He glosses over his failure to accurately gauge the Union numbers before each gap and Leeís desires that Stuart defend the gaps. Again, Stuart, not unlike other general officers in their official reports, portrays his movements as deliberate, well-planned, and successful despite their poor results. Stuartís ride from Harperís Ferry to Sharpsburg to personally bring the good news about its fall to Lee (about which Lee had already received news)52 can be viewed as another of his unnecessary grandstanding exploits despite his statement that Jackson asked him to do so.53 Here, as later at Gettysburg, Lee had no time to coddle Stuart and met his report with a brusque reply.54
At Sharpsburg, Stuart was employed on Leeís far left flank covering the Confederate line from the Potomac to Jacksonís left. There, Stuart had in addition to his cavalry his horse artillery under Pelham.55 Stuartís performance during the battle of Sharpsburg was commendable. Leeís report stated that "General Stuart, with the cavalry and horse artillery, performed the duty intrusted to him of guarding our left wing with great energy and courage, and rendered valuable assistance in defeating the attack on that part of our line."56 Perhaps with the crisis at hand, Stuart had little time for festivities being under the watchful eyes of the army commander and senior generals. Stuart finally was able to fulfill Leeís expectations. Stuartís noteworthy actions during the battle do not mask his previous poor performances which demonstrably contributed to Leeís being forced to stand and fight on the Antietam and nearly losing his army.
In the final analysis, Stuartís performance during Leeís Maryland Campaign receives mixed reviews: his screening was very good, his rear guard actions mixed, and his scouting poor. A few historians, aided perhaps by hindsight viewing a failed Confederate campaign, have found Stuart lacking, while most others find it at least adequate if not commendable. His screening efforts prior to and including the Frederick sojourn were at least good; rearguard actions from Frederick to South Mountain and his noteworthy defensive actions in Sharpsburg especially at Nicodemus Hill with his artillery are generally viewed as very good; his miscues at the South Mountain gaps and Harperís Ferry are recognized as failures. Virtually no modern historians or contemporaries have found that his scouting was good. Stuartís contemporary critics such as Rosser57 and Hill58 were not his friends so their statements must be viewed carefully. Even Stuartís most competent leader in Maryland, Munford, thought little of Stuart and was not careful about hiding it.59 Too, Pleasantonís cavalry performance, compared to Stuartís, shows that Pleasonton, for the most part, gave McClellan poorer quality intelligence than Stuart gave Lee. This shows that the spreading of disinformation by Stuartís troopers and other Confederates worked well. And Pinkertonís wonderful estimates of Confederate strength he gave McClellan are legendary here as well as during the Peninsular Campaign.
All who knew Stuart recognized his "Gay Cavalier" personality; it is likely that critics of his performance include those who in general viewed with a jaundiced eye his pleasure-seeking activities epitomized in Maryland by the Urbana Ball. Stuartís casual approach early in the campaign60 was probably influenced by Leeís relatively relaxed sojourn in Frederick and his light touch in overseeing his general officers.61 The focus of most studies of the Maryland Campaign has found that the reason for its failure was the finding of the Lost Order by McClellan but this concentration masks other contributory aspects such as Stuartís inadequate scouting. No doubt Stuartís even more egregious failure during the Gettysburg Campaign has also overshadowed his marginally better performance in Maryland.
-- Laurence Freiheit, Berkeley Springs, West Virginia
© 2006, Larry Freiheit
The illustration at the top is of General Stuart at the head of his column on the famous ride around the Federal Army of the Potomac in June 1862. The original lithograph by Henry Alexander Ogden was published in about 1900, and is at the US Library of Congress.
The lower picture is from Three Heroes, General Robert E. Lee on horseback flanked by Stonewall Jackson and Jeb Stuart, by F.C. Buroughs, 1893. It, too, is in the collection of the Library of Congress.
1 Harsh is the most thorough interpreter of Leeís actions during his Maryland Campaign and views Stuartís poor scouting among the chief reasons for its failure. "Stuartís performance in the Maryland campaign has perhaps been overrated" (114); "Either Lee misinterpreted the information he was receiving from his cavalry chief, or Stuart was supplying faulty intelligence" (166); "Stuart either did not discern, or detected but failed to alert Lee of, the considerable increase in the activity of the Federal cavalry on the 8th"(121); "Stuart moved too early and his execution was too casual...his operations not only exposed the rears of Walker and McLaws to the south, but they also left uncovered in the center the National Turnpike...along which...the Federal infantry was now advancing"(188); "The eyes and ears of the Confederate army [Stuart], while neither blind nor deaf, saw and heard very little on September 12" (205); "Leeís lack of alarm...was ignorance due to faulty intelligence" (212); and, "Stuart did not at first recognize the threat imminent in the advance of the Army of the Potomac...he did not grasp that time was running against the Confederates" (230). See also John Michael Priest, Before Antietam: The Battle for South Mountain, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Priest also was not impressed with Stuartís performance and showed his less attractive sides which also infected his staff with his need to "satisfy personal needs" and who "did not overexert himself" (2 ñ 3); "in Urbana, Jeb Stuart and the divisionís staff...spent the day resting" (60); "As was their custom, Stuart and his staff officers had decided to spend their leisure hours in comfort" (90); and "Stuart and his close knit staff quartered themselves in a comfortable farmhouse...and generally enjoyed themselves" (102).
Harsh, Joseph L., Taken at the Flood, Kent (Oh): Kent State University Press, 1999 [AotW citation 615]
2 Harsh did not find Stuartís performance universally poor, e.g., "On this occasion, Jeb Stuart justified his reputation for alert reconnaissance" (19). Not a few others also have found Stuartís actions valuable to Lee. Edwin C. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996), shows that Stuart did well. "Stuart maintained a tight cavalry screen, meanwhile scouting and threatening both of the Federalís flanks and spreading reports that had the invaders marching in several directions" (213). "[Union cavalry Brigadier General Pleasonton] would have to cope with Jeb Stuartís expert screening operations" (224). [AotW citation 616]
3 US War Department, The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (OR), 128 vols., Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1880-1901, Ser. 1, Vol. 19, pt. 2, pg. 590 [AotW citation 617]
4 Ibid., pg. 594 [AotW citation 618]
5 Ibid., pg. 600 [AotW citation 619]
6 Harsh shows a few verbal exchanges Lee had such as with Jackson and Stuart, (107-8); the infamous Brigadier John G. Walker interview which Harsh finds mostly took place in Walkerís mind (133-145); and with Jackson and Longstreet (145-152). [AotW citation 620]
7 Thomas, Emory M., Bold Dragoon: The Life of J.E.B. Stuart, New York: Random House, 1988, pg. 128.
Davis, Burke, Jeb Stuart, The Last Cavalier, New York: Rinehart, 1957, pg. 211 [AotW citation 621]
8 OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 19, pt. 1, pg. 67. McClellanís report dated 15 October 1862 contains this estimate by Nathaniel Banks which also shows total forces at Antietam of 97,445 for the South and 87,164 for the Union. Compare an arguably more realistic estimate of 5,600 on 1 September 1862 in Harsh (39). [AotW citation 622]
9 Ibid., pg. 810 [AotW citation 623]
10 OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 19, pt. 2, pg. 595. Special Orders No. 188, 5 September formally transferred Robertson to the Department of North Carolina. The same order also returned Cobbís Legion from Major General A.P. Hill to Stuart to be replaced by a company from the 12th Virginia Cavalry, and the cavalry squadron serving with D.H. Hill to be returned to Stuart when Stuart takes the advance. [AotW citation 624]
11 Robertsonís actions at Brandy Station in June 1863 and during the subsequent Gettysburg Campaign exemplify his inefficient command. Hill described him as "wonderfully inefficient" (169). Hill dickered with Robert E. Lee to whom Robertson should be transferred (182-183). It is likely that Stuart encouraged this transfer if he did not actively seek it.
Bridges, Hal, Lee's Maverick General: Daniel Harvey Hill, Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1991, pp. 169, 182-183 [AotW citation 625]
12 OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 19, pt. 2, pg. 589 [AotW citation 626]
13 Douglas, Henry Kyd, I Rode With Stonewall, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940, pg. 269 [AotW citation 627]
14 Davis pg. 195 [AotW citation 628]
15 Priest, pg. 45. [AotW citation 629]
16 Ibid., pg. 50. [AotW citation 630]
17 Ibid., pg. 53. [AotW citation 631]
18 Douglas, pg. 149. [AotW citation 632]
19 Blackford, William W., Lt. Col CSA, War Years with Jeb Stuart, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945, pg. 140 [AotW citation 633]
20 Harsh, pg. 129. [AotW citation 634]
21 OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 19, pt. 1, pg. 139 [AotW citation 635]
22 Harsh, pg. 315. [AotW citation 636]
23 Harsh, pp. 9, 79. [AotW citation 637]
24 Fishel, pg. 212. [AotW citation 638]
25 Harsh, pg. 108. [AotW citation 639]
26 Fishel, pg. 213. [AotW citation 640]
27 Harsh, pg. 241. [AotW citation 641]
28 In this thorough article, Jones argues convincingly that the most likely culprit was Henry Kyd Douglas. First published in Civil War Regiments: A Journal of the American Civil War, Vol. 5, No. 3, (1997), Savas Publishing Co.
Jones, Wilbur D., Who Lost the Lost Order? Stonewall Jackson, His Courier, and Special Orders No. 191, Published c. 2002, first accessed 01 June 2006, <http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Barracks/3627/loser.html> [AotW citation 642]
29 Harsh, pg. 252. [AotW citation 643]
30 Harsh, pg. 241. [AotW citation 644]
31 Gallagher, Gary W. , Editor, Lee the Soldier, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996, pg. 26 [AotW citation 645]
32 OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 19, pt. 1, pg. 816 [AotW citation 646]
33 Harsh, pg. 299. [AotW citation 647]
34 Harsh, pp. 67-71. [AotW citation 648]
35 Harsh, pp. 88-91. [AotW citation 649]
36 Harsh, pg. 108. [AotW citation 650]
37 OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 19, pt. 1, pg. 145 [AotW citation 651]
38 Ibid., pg. 145 [AotW citation 652]
39 OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 19, pt. 2, pg. 607 [AotW citation 653]
40 Ibid., pg. 606. [AotW citation 654]
41 Harsh, pg. 244. [AotW citation 655]
42 Harsh, pg. 234. [AotW citation 656]
43 OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 19, pt. 1, pg. 140 [AotW citation 657]
44 Ibid., pg. 145. [AotW citation 658]
45 Ibid., pg. 146. [AotW citation 659]
46 Bridges, pg. 101. [AotW citation 660]
47 OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 19, pt. 1, pg. 817, "This was obviously no place for cavalry operations, a single horseman passing from point to point on the mountain with difficulty." [AotW citation 661]
48 Ibid., pg. 817. [AotW citation 662]
49 Bridges, pp. 101, 102. [AotW citation 663]
50 Ibid., pg. 854. [AotW citation 664]
51 Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983, pg. 145 [AotW citation 665]
52 Harsh, pg. 307. [AotW citation 666]
53 OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 19, pt. 1, pg. 819 [AotW citation 667]
54 Harsh, pg. 322. [AotW citation 668]
55 Sears, pg. 145. [AotW citation 669]
56 OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 19, pt. 1, pg. 152 [AotW citation 670]
57 Thomas, pg. 261. Stuartís failure to gain Rosserís promotion earlier in the war had to influence Rosserís anti-Stuart feelings noted here in 1863. [AotW citation 671]
58 Bridges, pg. 30. [AotW citation 672]
59 Priest, pg. 7. [AotW citation 673]
60 Priest, pp. 3, 4, 60. [AotW citation 674]
61 Murfin, states that "Stuart had rather free license with his maneuvering" implying that Lee did not keep a tight rein on Stuart.
Murfin, James V., The Gleam Of Bayonets: The Battle Of Antietam And Robert E. Lee's Maryland Campaign, September, 1862, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965, pg. 169 [AotW citation 675]