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HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY CORPS,
September 24, 1862
General R. E. LEE,
Commanding Army of Northern Virginia.
GENERAL:
I have the honor to report the part performed by my command
and by myself in the recent operations of our army, and
especially as to service rendered in defending the Potomac
Ford at Shepherdstown, in connection with General Jackson's
capture of Harper's Ferry and the battle of Sharpsburg:
In obedience to
orders from the War Department on August 19, my immediate
command moved from Richmond on the 20th to co-operate with
the forces on the North Anna River, and, in compliance with
your own direction, it marched forward with that entire force
toward your front lines on the 26th.
By request of the
President, my personal progress to join you was more rapid
than that of the column. After bestowing a day upon requisite
arrangements, I committed the General Reserve Artillery to
Lieutenant-Colonel Cutts, under the senior general, D. H.
Hill, and hastened on to your headquarters. Some uncertainty
as to the route, amid the changing scenes of the occasion,
and an enfeebling disease, in part retarded my progress,
though, with medical aid, I ceaselessly pressed on; so that
not until after midday Saturday, August 30, could I reach
you, on the memorable battle-field of that day, near Manassas
(second Manassas). Having reported and delivered messages
from the President, I was kindly urged by you to seek some
convenient place in the rear, where rest and medical
treatment might relieve the disorder then prostrating me.
This, after witnessing the battle for perhaps two hours with
intense interest, I found myself compelled to do; and under
the hospitable roof of Mr. Foote, robbed though he had been
of almost everything by the unscrupulous enemy, received for
a few days the kindest attention.
On Wednesday,
September 3, my command had arrived at Sudley, and, though
still unwell, I joined it and marched with the troops to
Leesburg. There, besides other work, I had, preparatory to
crossing into Maryland, to arrange for sifting out the
reduced and strengthening the more efficient batteries in all
the artillery battalions with this part of our army. Physical
exhaustion rendered this task scarce less than severe.
Major Richardson
was left in charge of the batteries, sections, feeble horses,
&c., detained, with orders to take them to the
neighborhood of Winchester, and there establish a depot for
the recruiting of horses, &c., while the battalions of
Lieutenant-Colonel Cutts and Major Nelson were prepared for
advancing.
Sunday, September
7, with the portions of these two battalions not detailed on
special duty, I proceeded to the neighborhood of Frederick,
Md., and there reported on the morning of the 8th.
On Wednesday, 10th,
the command, excluding Lieutenant-Colonel Cutts' battalion,
which had been assigned to duty with General D. H. Hill's
division, and including the battalions of Col. J. T. Brown,
of Maj. William Nelson, and of Col. S. D. Lee, who had then
reported to me, marched with the army toward Hagerstown.
Sunday morning,
14th, we were summoned to return toward Boons borough, the
enemy having advanced upon General D. H. Hill. When I arrived
and reported to you a short distance from the battle-field,
you directed me to place in position on the heights of Beaver
Creek the several batteries of my command. This was
accordingly done, just before nightfall. At midnight I was
again summoned to your headquarters, and directed to send
Col. S. D. Lee, with his battalion, on the road to
Centreville [Keedysville], and to take the residue of my
command by the shortest route to Williamsport and across the
Potomac, and then to enter upon the duty of guarding the
fords of that river.
By sunrise, Monday,
15th, we had reached the intersection of the Hagerstown,
Sharpsburg, Boonsborough, and Williamsport roads, and there
received reliable intelligence of a large cavalry force of
the enemy not far ahead of us. I immediately posted guns to
the front and on the flank, sent messengers to General
Toombs, understood to be at Sharps-burg, for a regiment or
two of infantry, set to work collecting a band of armed
stragglers, and sent scouts to the front. These latter soon
returned and reported the road clear for some 2 miles. I
therefore determined to advance cautiously, without waiting
for infantry, in order to protect the large wagon train
proceeding by the Hagerstown road through Williamsport. The
cavalry, which consisted of three regiments, escaped from
Harper's Ferry, crossed our road perhaps less than an hour
ahead of us. We thus narrowly missed a rather strange
encounter. My purpose was, of course, if we met, to attempt
the destruction of those retiring invaders.
Having crossed the
Williamsport Ford, I assigned to Colonel Brown its defense
and that of another a mile or more lower down, and proceeded
with the remaining battalion (Major Nelson's) to the
neighborhood of Shepherdstown.
By 10 o'clock of
the 16th the guns were here in position on the heights
overlooking the ford, a mile below the town, and the passage
was thenceforward assiduously guarded.
Here other and
arduous duties devolved upon the command and upon myself. By
night or by day much labor was needed on the road; the
passage of troops had to be facilitated, and important
dispatches forwarded in different directions, all rendered
the more essential toward General Jackson hastening to
Sharpsburg after capturing Harper's Ferry. This continued
through the 17th, while the battle (Sharpsburg) was raging,
and during the night; especially in my having to meet a
requisition for all the long-range guns that could be
obtained and possibly spared from the fords. Instructions
also reached me to have apprehended and sent forward all
stragglers.
On the 18th
arrangements had to be made for meeting a demonstration of
the enemy reported at Shepherd's Ford, 4 miles above. Some
cavalry and a small infantry force of collected stragglers,
duly organized for the occasion, were sent thither with a
battery. While engaged in these duties I was again summoned
to aid in repairing roads and facilitating the passage of
troops. The difficult achievement of recrossing our army,
with its extensive train, over that single ford, during the
night, and the enemy close at hand, having been resolved
upon, every available man and officer of my immediate
command, and such others as could be gathered, were at once
set to work removing obstructions, preventing collisions,
having lights at hand as needed, and promoting the orderly
movement of vehicles on the several routes.
After a night thus
spent, Major Nelson and myself were, by dawn Friday, 19th, in
saddle, for the purpose of securing guns from some of the
artillery that had crossed, and placing them in position to
aid in repelling the enemy when he should appear. Forty-four
guns were thus secured; of these the character, position,
&c., were as follows: A 10-pounder Parrott and two other
rifles, under Captain Maurin, on the right hand height, 200
or 300 yards from the river; next him, on the left, a
10-pounder Parrott, under Lieutenant Maddox. On his left,
Captain Milledge had four 3-inch rifles and a 12-pounder
howitzer. Next to Captain Milledge, Captain [W. H.] Chapman
was placed, with one rifle and one Napoleon. On the left of
these, and on the brow of the cliff overlooking the ford, and
to rake it and its approaches, Capt. M. Johnson was placed
with two 6-pounders and two howitzers. These dispositions
were all below the road leading directly from the ford, along
a ravine, to the interior. Above that road Captain
Kirkpatrick, with two 6-pounders and two 12-pounder
howitzers, occupied the brow of the cliff, to cross fire with
Captain Johnson upon the ford and its approaches.
On Captain
Kirkpatrick's left, and for a like purpose, was placed
Captain Huckstep's battery of four 6-pounders. On an eminence
to his left were planted two 10-pounder Parrotts, of Captain
Braxton's battery. Still farther to the left, and on an
elevation more commanding, though farther from the river,
were located an effective 12-pounder Whitworth, under Captain
Barnwell, my ordnance officer, and two 10-pounder Parrotts,
under Captain Hardaway. Nearer to the river, and still to the
left, positions were, by Colonel Long, assigned to a battery
of four 6-pounders, to sweep the road on the opposite shore;
and, to their left, two 10-pounder Parrotts, of a Louisiana
battery (the names of their officers are not remembered).
There being no favorable positions for other guns, the eleven
remaining of the forty-four mentioned were removed beyond
range, to be called up if required.
These arrangements
had not been all completed, when, about 8 a.m. of the l9th,
the enemy appeared on the distant heights opposite, and found
our army entirely and safely across the ford, and on the
Virginia side of the Potomac. They soon brought up and opened
artillery much exceeding ours in weight. Still, our rifles
did excellent service in keeping at bay for hours the entire
hostile host, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, which, in
various positions, appeared; care being taken not to waste
ammunition in mere long-range exchanges of shot. Our troops
that had been briefly resting in the valleys were now ordered
farther inland, to be out of reach of the shells, &c., so
numerously hurled by the enemy, yet near enough to turn
readily upon and perhaps destroy the adverse army should it
force the passage of the river and take position between it
and our forces.
From yourself, I
received instructions to hold the position all that day and
the night succeeding, unless the pressure should become too
great, in which event I was, at my discretion, to withdraw
after dark, it being most unlikely that a discreet commander
would then risk the destruction of his entire army by getting
it across in the night, and being assailed when in disorder
next morning, with such a river behind him-Should I find it
best at nightfall to withdraw, I was to follow the track of
our army. I was informed also that two brigades of infantry
would remain as a support to the ford, defending artillery
(those of Generals Armistead and Lawton); these commanded,
the former by Colonel Hodges and the latter by Colonel Lamar.
They were to picket the ford, and, screening themselves as
well as possible, to act as sharpshooters on the bank. I was,
by General Longstreet, requested to take charge of these
brigades. I did so, and instructed the colonels commanding to
keep their force at the ford strong, vigilant, and as well
sheltered as occasion allowed, and to have the residue well
in hand, back of adjacent hills, for protection, till needed.
My directions were also given them not to fire merely in
reply to shots from the other side, but only to repel any
attempt at crossing, and to guard the ford. My own position
was chosen at a point central, moderately protected by
conformation of ground, at the same time commanding the
general view and accessible from every direction, with as
little exposure of messengers as any one place in such a
scene could be. And here, except when some personal
inspection or order had to be given requiring temporary
absence, I remained for best service throughout the day.
During most of the
forenoon the enemy's fire was furious, and, under cover of
it, in spite of persistent vigor on the part of our
batteries, a heavy body of sharpshooters gained the canal
bank on the northern and hostile side of the river. This
proved to us an evil not slightly trying, since it, exposed
our nearer cannoneers to be picked off, when serving their
guns, by the enemy's effective infantry rifles.
From the advanced
batteries on the left I was, therefore, applied to for some
infantry to counteract in part this evil, by availing
themselves of any cover at hand to serve as sharpshooters on
that part of our side. I accordingly ordered to the duty 200
of the infantry in reserve.
After some time,
the cavalry officer commanding at the ford, 2 miles below,
notified me that the enemy was before him in force; had
planted a powerful battery, and could not be prevented
crossing unless I sent him some infantry. Considering the
importance of thus securing our flank, I judged it proper to
send him also an infantry force of between 100 and 200 men.
Of the extent of loss at Sharpsburg from the two brigades
left with me, and of their consequent very small numbers all
told, I had not been informed when their assignment to my
direction was made. In providing, therefore, for protecting
right and left, as described, I was not aware of infantry
weakness for the ford itself. This was, however, as the
evening progressed, made to me only too certain. The enemy's
fire, which had for a season relaxed, became fiercer than
before, and so directed as to rake most of the hollows, as
well as the hills, we occupied. At the same time their
infantry at the canal breastwork was much increased, and the
crack of their sharpshooters became a continuous roll of
musketry. Colonels Lamar and Hodges both reported to me that
the pressure on their small force, the whole of which
remaining I had ordered to the river, and the sum total when
all were there was, they informed me, scarcely 300, was
becoming too great to be borne. I directed them to hold on an
hour longer; sunset was at hand, and I had communicated with
Colonel Munford, who promised at dark to be with us; that by
that time I would have the batteries withdrawn; they should,
after due notice, retire next the batteries, and the cavalry
should fall in between them and the enemy, so that all would
get rightly out. This plan, I judged it, under the
circumstances, best on the whole to adopt, in the discretion
left with me, as the reason of the case already indicated
seemed not to justify the sacrifice incident to utmost
resistance against any crossing. While these directions were
passing, the commanders of battery after battery notified me
that their ammunition was exhausted, and that they were thus
exposed to small purpose. Their request for permission to
retire, under such circumstances, it was not deemed wise to
grant wherever the movement could be seen by the enemy; in
case where they could get back unseen, it was sanctioned.
Instructions were sent to each battery, besides, to retire in
specified order, as dusk deepened to conceal them in so
doing. It was, of course, a critical and anxious hour,
inasmuch as a dashing force might, on the necessary reduction
of our fire, get across and capture some of our
longest-served and latest-removed guns.
Deep dusk had now
arrived; certain batteries, as allowed, were on their way
inland, while others, as directed, were well using ammunition
still on hand. My own position was taken near the point of
chief importance, directly back from the ford, so that I
might the better know of and control each requisite
operation. The members of my staff vigorously seconded my
endeavors, under furious fire, in carrying orders and
supervising their fulfillment, and everything appeared
likely, under favoring Providence, to result in effecting the
withdrawal planned.
This prospect was,
however, suddenly changed. A number of infantry-men rushed
rapidly by the point I occupied. Arresting them, I learned
that they were of the sharpshooters who held guard at the
ford; that their body had all given way, and that some of the
enemy were already on our side of the river. Worn as were
these men, their state of disorder, akin to panic, was not,
justly, to be met with harshness. They were, however,
encouraged to be steady and useful in checking disorder, and
affording such tokens as they might, in the settling dark, of
force, to make the enemy cautious. No other means had I of
keeping back an advance. All my staff were, at the moment,
absent but two, one of whom was instantly sent to find, as
carefully as possible, the state of facts toward the ford;
the other, to secure the orderly retirement of the last
batteries and of everything attached to my own headquarters,
evidences being unmistakable that the reported crossing was
in part a fact. My personal situation was all the while
necessarily much exposed, and now to easy capture, accessible
as it was to cavalry in a few moments, should such have
crossed and be coming forward.
The arrival of our
own cavalry being now unlikely, I had to determine, at once,
what duty required of myself. The enemy would doubtless adopt
one of two courses; either, shrinking from hidden danger,
cautiously proceed only 100 or 200 yards, or, more
adventurous, push on a force along the chief road as he could
find it. In the former case, our guns, &c., would, as
considerately instructed, get fairly out of reach, and this
was, in the main, my expectation; still, the other course, a
pushing hostile force, had to be provided for. I therefore
proceeded to a point in the road probably not then reached by
any party of the enemy, on foot and leading my horse, and
accompanied by my adjutant and ordnance sergeant, who had
rejoined me, along a path still thundered over by the enemy's
shells and crossing the road inland from the river. Those
shells were obviously indicative of no intended advance of
any considerable body of the enemy; firing on their own
troops thus would scarcely be risked. Along the road I found
the rear of our artillery column properly moving. Mounting
here, I rode with the column and employed the two young
officers in moving our hospital camp and enforcing order
along the entire column.
While thus
proceeding, I learned that General Pryor was resting not far
ahead with the division under his command. Finding him
perhaps within 2 miles of the river, I made known to him the
state of facts, and asked of him a detail to go back with me
that I might at least, were any guns captured, recover them,
or, endangered, secure them. The general thought the
responsibility too serious for him to assume, and requested
me to refer the matter to General Hood, supposed near.
General Hood's staff was found on the march, but himself,
unwell, I was told, I did not see. No one could inform me
where General Longstreet was. To find yourself, then, was
clearly my next duty. This, in the extreme darkness and amid
the intricacies of unknown routes, proved a task of no little
difficulty and delay. At length, succeeding, and making known
to you the main facts, I was instructed to do no more till
morning, when measures would be taken suited to
circumstances, and meantime to secure a few hours of
necessary rest. Early the next morning I had the privilege of
accompanying a force, under General Jackson, sent to punish
the enemy; of attending that honored officer and friend in
the exposure incident to his command, and of witnessing the
destructive chastisement inflicted upon the several thousands
that had crossed and remained on the south side of the river.
Under the immediate orders of General A. P. Hill, his
division made upon that doomed body of the enemy a resistless
charge, to their actual extermination. The furious fire of
the enemy from beyond the Potomac, though necessarily harmful
at first, proved far less damaging than it must otherwise
have been, because such direction had to be given their
pieces as to spare their own troops receiving the charge.
This severe work
having been accomplished, I found that but four of our pieces
had been lost. These, their horses being killed and the men
being too weary to drag them away, had been spiked and left.
They were, next morning, found by the enemy and thrown over
the cliffs, before General Jackson's arrival to destroy them.
About noon of this
day, Saturday, September 20, returning from Shepherdstown
along the Winchester road, about 4 miles on the way, I joined
our batteries, commanded by Major Nelson. With others,
similarly instructed by myself, he had been diligently
engaged the previous evening in causing batteries to be
withdrawn in order, as directed, and the anticipated caution
of the enemy had allowed them all to get back with no further
damage than the leaving of one gun apiece by each of four
batteries, as already mentioned.
Captain Maurin, an
officer of tried merit: was, as said, compelled to spike and
leave a 10-pounder Parrott; Captain Milledge, a 12-pounder
brass howitzer; Capt. M. Johnson, also a 12-pounder brass
howitzer, and Captain Huckstep, an iron 6-pounder.
The brass howitzer
12-pounder left by Captain Milledge proves, I regret to
report, to have been a gun marked with the coat of arms of
our own commonwealth, and belonging to the Virginia Military
Institute, and to have been, on these accounts, especially
valued. The Confederate States Government will, I hope and
earnestly recommend, have of it a fac simile made and returned to the
Virginia Military Institute.
Besides these
losses, we had, in the batteries, 3 men killed and 4 wounded,
and of horses, 26 killed and disabled. What casualties
occurred in the infantry under Colonels Lamar and Hodges I
have not been informed. Those officers have reported, I take
for granted, through their division commanders.
That the immense
force of the enemy was so effectually kept back and our army
quietly relieved from disturbance by the persistent vigor and
endurance of our comparatively small repelling strength, and
with no greater loss, is assuredly cause for thankfulness to
the Giver of good, and occasion for just appreciation of
fidelity on the part of officers and men who performed the
service.
Major Nelson's cool
courage and persistent vigor throughout the day, and in the
trying hour at its close, deserve especial mention. His
services were of great value. Captains Hardaway, Kirkpatrick,
Braxton, Maurin--indeed, every artillery officer from time to
time under my eye, and as otherwise known of by me--performed
stern duty, I am satisfied, with commendable resolution and
skill, as did the men. Captain Barn-well, of my staff,
distinguished himself by the efficiency with which, under
ceaseless exposure to shells hurled at his position, he
managed our accurate Whitworth gun. My aide, Lieut. Charles
Hatcher, and Sergt. Maj. Robert Jones also deserve honorable
mention for the alacrity with which they bore my messages in
every direction under hottest fire. Other members of my staff
were, for the most part, absent on duty previously assigned.
To Colonels Lamar and Hodges and the troops they commanded
credit is justly due for the persevering determination with
which they bore during all the day a fire, doubly galling, of
case shot from the enemy's cannon and of musketry from the
vastly outnumbering infantry force sheltered by the canal
bank across the river. Not until overworn did the handful of
our sharpshooters at all give way, and that would probably
have been prevented could a double number, partly sheltered
by trees, &c., have allowed relief in action.
Thankful that so much was done with
such partial loss, I have the honor to be, most respectfully,
your obedient servant,
W. N. PENDLETON,
Brigadier-General and Chief of
Artillery.
For
convenience, a sketch is annexed of our entire artillery
organization for and after the campaign.
With the First
Corps, or right wing, of the Army of Northern Virginia,
commanded by Lieutenant-General Longstreet, consisting of
nineteen brigades, adjusted into five divisions, served an
artillery force of 112 guns, viz: Forty-five rifles, 13
Napoleons, and 54 common smooth-bores, arranged into six
battalions of several batteries each, of which battalions one
attended each division and one constituted the corps reserve
artillery. With the Second Corps, or left wing, commanded by
Lieut. Gen. T. J. Jackson, and consisting of a brigade or two
less than the other, adjusted into four divisions, served an
artillery force of 123 guns, viz: Fifty-two rifles, 18
Napoleons, and 53 short range, arranged into battalions,
attached and commanded as in the First Corps.
The cavalry corps,
commanded by Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, had also attached to
it an effective mounted battery, known as Pelham's Horse
Artillery, armed with two rifles and two 12-pounder
howitzers.
Besides the general
charge of all this artillery, its equipment, organization,
and constant efficiency for and in action, the general chief
of artillery held, under personal orders as the
Commander-in-Chief might direct, a general reserve artillery,
consisting of three battalions with several batteries each,
having in all 15 rifles, 1 Napoleon, and 20 short-range guns,
so that in our artillery service with the Army of Northern
Virginia there were, adjusted as described, 275 guns.
Respectfully,
W. N. P.